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EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES DRUG WAR POLICY 






As the United States continues to recover from the greatest recession since the Great 
Depression, the U.S. government must find cost savings.  Therefore, this project aimed to 
find efficiencies through reallocating funds from a program proven ineffective.  U.S. 
foreign aid programs such as Plan Colombia, in conjunction with Colombian President 
Uribe’s “Democratic Security” strategy, caused a significant drop in murder rates, the 
number of displaced people, and the number of kidnappings in Colombia over the last ten 
years.  The purpose of beginning the drug war in Colombia was to interdict the drugs at 
the source.  However, as a result of the “balloon effect” into Peru and Bolivia and 
technological advances by the narco-traffickers, the net result of interdiction has been 
virtually zero.  Additionally, the source of the United States’ drug problem is not in 
Colombia, but with the user and his or her demand for illicit drugs. Therefore, this project 
recommends aligning funding to support rehabilitation and prevention programs that will 
reduce the likelihood that a person will have the desire to abuse drugs again.  Though 
there are possibly negative short-term effects of this policy, this project shows that the 
long-term effect favors rehabilitation and prevention. 
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The Obama administration is faced with some extremely difficult decisions; none 
may be more challenging than reducing the national debt. Some economists have 
characterized the last two years as the worst recession since the 1930s. Unemployment is 
at its highest levels in nearly 20 years at 9.6 percent.  The national debt exceeds fourteen 
trillion dollars and most Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth projections for the next 
two years are less than 4% (“GDP Growth Rate Remains Below 4%,” p. 2). The 
Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, called the 
national debt, “… the single biggest threat to national security.” As the president and 
members of congress debate whether to lower the mounting debt and deficit by 
increasing taxes or reducing federal spending, it is imperative to conduct a thorough 
analysis of how those tax dollars are spent.    
In 2010, the federal budget was $3.5 trillion. Approximately $2.2 trillion was 
appropriated to fund mandatory spending, while the remaining $1.3 trillion went to fund 
discretionary spending (OMB website). Though foreign aid accounts for only a small 
portion of discretionary spending it is an important part of the United States’ foreign 
policy. The United States government claims to benefit from giving foreign aid by 
promoting the expansion of democracy and protecting its national interests around the 
world. Since the end of World War II, the United States has given aid for reconstruction, 
humanitarian, military, disaster relief, and security efforts.  
The largest benefactors of U.S. foreign aid over the last 10 years are Israel, Egypt 
and Colombia, respectively.   
The U.S. government fears that an unstable Colombia may threaten the United 
States’ national security.  Failed states are commonly defined as: 
• Having a central government so weak or ineffective that it has little 
practical control over much of its territory 
• Non-provision of public services 
• Widespread corruption and criminality 
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• Refugees and involuntary movement of populations 
• Sharp economic decline (Fund for Peace website). 
Cocaine production, fueled by the demand from the United States and European countries 
is a catalyst for the failed state characteristics exhibited in Colombia during the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. 
A. UNITED STATES’ RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
The investment that the United States made in Colombia has not produced a 
measurable return for the United States.  The United States government spent 
approximately $7.3 billion in cash, capital equipment, and training to date since the 
inception of Plan Colombia (Center for International Policy, p. 1).  The United States’ 
goal of stopping cocaine at the source requires significant energy and effort from both 
governments.  However, the United States’ only significant success has been developing 
a strong ally in the region.  Due to the United States exchanging a comparatively 
insignificant $11 billion in trade annually with Colombia, which is only 0.077% of the 
United States’ Gross Domestic Product, the Colombian partnership is not crucial because 
of trade (World Bank, p. 1).   Conversely, the investment to provide stability in the region 
still has developed lasting effects throughout the region.   
An indicator that the eradication process is working in Colombia is the street 
price.  In accordance with the basic laws of supply and demand, the resultant price of 
cocaine should increase over time as the supply is diminished.  Dr. David Henderson, in 
“The U.S. Drug War on Latin America” explains the situation in comparison to coffee.   
…Imagine that U.S. government officials decide that the caffeine in coffee 
is a dangerous drug to which far too many Americans are addicted, and 
therefore the government decides to ban the import, domestic production, 
and consumption of coffee… Assume also that the government makes the 
penalties for producing, selling, importing, and consuming coffee 
equivalent to the penalties for engaging in the same activities with 
cocaine.  What happens next? First, people who want to obey the law, a 
group that will include almost all current importers and sellers of coffee, 
will leave the business, both because the vast majority of the people in the 
business are not criminals and do not want to become criminals, and 
because the coffee business has suddenly been made much riskier.  As 
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sellers exit, the supply of coffee is lessened and the new equilibrium price 
is higher.  This high price will lead to high apparent profits, but they are 
only apparent. Adjusted for the risks of capture, imprisonment, fines, and 
confiscation of property, the profits are actually a normal, competitive 
return to the people and capital that are in the newly-illegal industry. 
(Henderson, 2003, p. 3) 
As shown in Figure 1, the mean price of a gram of cocaine since the inception of Plan 
Colombia adjusted to 2007 U.S. dollars is $114, with a standard deviation of 14.52.  The 
purity of cocaine decreased from an average of 69.7% in 2006 to 43.9% in 2008.  The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime attributes the drastic reduction in purity to a 
reduction in supply. Since the initiation of Plan Colombia, the mean price of a gram of 
cocaine adjusted for the fluctuation in purity in constant 2007 dollars is $177.80, with a 
standard deviation of 36.94 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009, p. 71). 
Both prices trend downward over time, which allows one to infer that the supply entering 

















Figure 1.   United States Street Price of Cocaine (From: United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, p. 220) 
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B. COLOMBIA’S RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
Colombia, however, has gained an increased interdiction capacity due to the 
United States’ funding.  The U.S. government’s investment has directly augmented the 
Colombian National Police (CNP), Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN) Colombia, and 
Colombian military.  The Department of State’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) 
invested $72 million in the CNP and DIRAN for aerial eradication.  The aviation tactics, 
maintenance, logistics, communications, and managerial skills are all greatly improved 
due to the partnership of Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.  The 
Colombian government agencies were able to spray over 153,000 hectares of land in 
2007 and documented preventing approximately 160 metric tons of cocaine from entering 
the U.S. annually.  In 2008, the NAS invested an additional $10 million in manual 
eradication efforts to combat the replanting of illicit crops (Bogota Embassy, p. 3).   
The NAS spent $70 million in police aviation for the CNP.  The CNP received 
pilot and gunner training in addition to 49 helicopters and 13 planes.  The program also 
includes contract maintenance and logistical support, U.S. and local training, aviation 
fuel, and technical expertise.  The more robust Colombian Army Aviation program 
received $104M, which included 53 helicopters and training for 340 pilots, 200 
mechanics, and 442 aerial gunners.   
The NAS also spent $34.5 million on various interdiction efforts.  The 
Counterdrug Brigade is the land army element that specializes in counternarcotics, 
performs advanced work for eradication, and pursues the criminals that shoot spray 
planes.   The Jungulas are trained by the U.S. Army Special Forces to destroy chemical 
and base labs and eliminate high value targets.  The Air Bridge Denial force stops the 
aerial transport of cocaine, which includes destroying aircraft and maintaining air 
superiority in the drug war.  Finally, the NAS program for maritime interdiction 
supporting the Colombian Navy is coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard and elements 




transported by a “go-fast skiff” and approximately ten tons can be transported in a semi-
submersible vessel.  Therefore, the capacity to combat the maritime transport vehicles is 
a critical mission area (Bogota Embassy, p. 4).   
C. DANGER OF BLACK MARKET INFLUENCES ON COCAINE  
Under the current policy regarding illicit drugs, the black market artificially 
increases the price due to parties undertaking extra risks to not be apprehended by the 
authorities when growing, transporting, and selling the illegal narcotics.  A typical family 
growing the coca plant will make the required paste, which sells for approximately $1.50 
per gram, or $1,500 per kilo.  Each batch will net them $14 in profit.  In Bogotá, the price 
is increased to approximately $8,000 for the kilo of cocaine.  By the time it reaches the 
United States, it is $30,000 for the same kilo, and in other countries, it can be even 
higher.  The minimum value on the cocaine exports before the intermediate entities 
increase the price is approximately $5 billion.  A gram of cocaine distributed in the 
United States is rarely over 50% in purity, but the retail value of the product is over $25 
billion (Cultural Survival, p. 2).   
D. COLOMBIA AS A STRATEGIC ALLY  
These criminals are willing to undermine the current government structure, 
causing roadblocks in the diplomatic processes.  Political uncertainty in a region where 
various ships transited over 14,000 times with over 1.4 billion tons of cargo through the 
Panama Canal in Fiscal Year 2009 is unsettling (Panama Canal Authority, p. 1).   
Colombia’s large coal and natural gas reserves, paired with its ranking fifth in 
amount of oil production in Latin America, make it a significant country in the area (CIA, 
p.1).  Colombia’s proximity to the Panama Canal and countries where the United States 
has strained ties (e.g., Venezuela and Ecuador) make it important that the United States’ 
diplomatic, military, and economic interests are preserved.  Venezuelan President, Hugo 
Chavez, said in a press conference that America is "the cruelest, most terrible, most 
cynical, most murderous empire to have existed in the entire history (Adams, 2008, p. 
2).”  This is strong negative rhetoric from Venezuela, a nation that is eleventh in the 
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world, third in Latin America in oil production, and fifth in Latin America in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita concerns the U.S. government.  The United States 
imported approximately 51% of its crude oil from foreign nations in 2009.  Venezuela 
ranked second in the amount of net oil imports (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010, p. 1).  
However, according to David Henderson, if Venezuela refused to sell its oil to the United 
States, it would not cause an unfavorable cost fluctuation for the United States, because 
the United States could buy their oil elsewhere.  Where would the United States get the 
added oil?  From those suppliers who now have freed up supplies because they bought 
the oil that Chavez freed up by not selling to the United States.  In Henderson’s 
formulation, this is like a game of musical chairs in which the number of chairs equals 
the number of players.  The only way Chavez could hurt the United States would be to 
cut absolute production.  But then he would hurt all consumers, not just U.S. consumers 
(Henderson, 2007, pp. 6–7).    
The United States’ strained ties with Ecuador are due to a bombing that took place 
in March 2008 by Colombian troops.  Though the Colombian raid eliminated the second-
in-command leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Raul 
Reyes, the Ecuadoreans thought that intelligence provided by the United States from their 
base in Manta, Ecuador extended past the fringes of the Manta pact’s purpose.  The 
resulting backlash caused Ecuador to dissolve its sole Drug War partnership with the 
United States, which was through the Manta base.  Additionally, the United States 
resorted to signing another agreement with Colombia in October 2009 withdrawing its 
basing in Manta and redistributes those forces to seven bases throughout Colombia to 
continue anti-drug operations.  Hugo Chavez, regarding the event, stated that the United 
States intended to use the new pact with Colombia to establish a means of invading 
Venezuela (Bronstein, 2009, p. 1).   
E. CONCLUSION  
Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative have not been an equal resounding 
success for all participants. However, Colombia has benefited in many areas 
tremendously. The drug related violence that led Colombia to record more than 2,400 
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kidnappings, and 1.5 million displaced citizens in 2000, has fallen to a fraction of that 
today (Marcella, p. 4). In May 2010, Colombian Police Chief, General Oscar Naranjo, 
reported kidnappings were down 93% since 2002, which he said represented a 4% drop 
from the same period last year (Sumpter, 2010, p. 1).  
The influx of U.S. resources, coupled with the “iron-fisted” leadership of former 
president Alvaro Uribe, enabled Colombia to restore security to large portions of the 
fragmented country.  Additionally, the elimination of the paramilitaries that provided 
protection for the large Medellin and Cali drug cartels of the 1990s also contributed to the 
drop in violence. The small army of assassins for hire is no longer essential or desired by 
drug traffickers. Today’s drug traffickers realize the large “cartels” of the late 1990s are 
high value targets for the Colombian and United States authorities. Therefore, smaller, 
more controllable, compartmentalized groups are utilized, and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) serves as protection from law enforcement (Senlis Council, 
2006, p. 68). 
Finally, the membership of the once dominant FARC and National Liberation 
Army (ELN) terrorist groups that controlled more than 40% of Colombia’s territory in 
1998 is hardly a fraction of what it was at its peak in the late 1990s. One estimate 
indicates the FARC’s membership has decreased from 17,000 in 1998, to roughly 8,000 
today, while the ELN’s end strength has declined from 5,000 in 1998, to less than one 
thousand members today. The success Colombia has seen cannot be ignored and must be 
applauded. However, critics of the war on drugs are quick to point out the recent 
successes in Colombia are reversible. They argue that annual appropriations from the 
United States will be required for Colombia to maintain the advances, made over the last 
decade (Hanson, 2009, p. 1). 
The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime reports that cocaine cultivation has 
declined in Colombia by more than 50% over the last decade; however, total coca 
cultivation for the Andean region was nearly stable. For several decades, the eradication 
of the coca plant has been a key component of drug interdiction policy for Colombia. The 
durability and flexibility of the illegal drug networks have shown long term solutions 
cannot be achieved through eradication alone, given limited resources (Hanson, 2009, p. 
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1).  Since 2001, eradication has failed in its main goal of reducing levels of coca 
cultivation, primarily due to the “balloon-effect.” This effect displaces cultivation to 
more remote areas that are beyond the reach of law enforcement agencies. As a result of 
Colombia’s aggressive aerial eradication program, coca cultivation has increased in the 
neighboring countries of Peru, Boliva, and Ecuador (Senlis Council, 2006, p. 53). 
While Colombia has seen some success in recent years, the same cannot be said 
of the United States. In 1969, President Nixon declared drugs, “Public Enemy Number 
One” and more than 40 years later, drugs are still readily available on street corners 
throughout America.  The fact that price levels and availability of drugs in the U.S. have 
remained relatively stable indicates narcotic interdiction programs, such as Plan 
Colombia have had very little impact on the U.S. cocaine market. 
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II. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN 
COLOMBIA 
A. HISTORY OF FOREIGN POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA   
Since the early twentieth century, the United States has officially committed itself 
to support countries seeking a democratic form of government.  This has never been truer 
than during the days of the Cold War within Latin America.  Several Latin American 
countries received massive political, social, military and financial support from the 
United States government over the last century.  However, the benefits to the United 
States and the receiving country have been marginal at best.  Yet, the United States 
continues to spend billions of dollars each year to fund questionable Latin American 
programs. To understand the United States commitment to Latin America, the origins of 
American foreign policy for the region must first be explained.  
American foreign policy in Latin America is built off four primary policies: the 
Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy, and Kennedy’s 
Alliance for Progress (Escobar, 2010, p. 3).  The Monroe Doctrine laid the foundation for 
the United States’ foreign policy, and under this policy, European countries could no 
longer interfere with affairs of the states in the Western Hemisphere.  In exchange, the 
United States would remain neutral in conflicts between European countries and their 
colonies.  As can be seen with the case of the Phillipines during the McKinley 
presidency, however, the U.S. government did not keep its side of the bargain.  Escobar 
writes, “If European powers were to interfere with the independent nations of the 
Americas, this action would have been considered hostile” (Escobar, 2010, p. 2).  
Consequently, the drafting of the Monroe doctrine established a principle of isolation to 
the entire continent.  
In 1904, President Roosevelt amended the Monroe Doctrine with the Roosevelt 
Corollary (Escobar, 2010, p. 3). The Roosevelt Corollary officially integrated an 
important tool of American influence into the Monroe Doctrine.  Throughout the 20th 
century, the United States used direct and indirect U.S. military campaigns in several 
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Latin American countries. The Roosevelt Corollary justified the U.S. military 
involvement in Cuba (1906), Nicaragua (1909, 1912, and 1926), the Dominican Republic 
(1916) and numerous other instances (Escobar, 2010, p. 3).  
As Escobar observes, again in 1909 to 1913, the United States amended its 
position on foreign policy in Latin America through Dollar Diplomacy.  Dollar 
Diplomacy was a phrase coined by President William Howard Taft, which encouraged 
commercial investment in Latin America and the Far East.  Some argue Dollar 
Diplomacy took many forms including, “…extensions of commerce treaties, acquisition 
of naval bases, establishment of protectorates, military intervention to coerce debtors, as 
well as direct intervention in the elections” (Escobar, 2010, p. 3). 
The fourth policy that helped to shape the United States position on foreign policy 
in Latin America is President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.  As discussed by 
Samuel Edwards, this program was an aggressive foreign aid program established by the 
United States whose primary purpose was to improve social conditions in Latin America 
(Edwards, 2009, p. 4).  A secondary goal of the program was to wean these struggling 
countries away from the communist movement, such as those created by Fidel Castro in 
Cuba.  During this period, several Central and South American countries experienced 
skyrocketing inflation and political unrest. The program goals according to Sebastian 
Edwards’ article, Forty Years of Latin America’s Economic Development: From the 
Alliance for Progress to the Washington Consensus were: 
• Annual increases of 2.5% in per capita income 
• Establishment of democratic governments 
• Elimination of adult illiteracy by 1970 
• Price stability, to avoid inflation or deflation 
• More equitable income distribution, land reform 
• Economic and social planning 
Latin American countries (excluding Cuba) pledged a capital investment of $80 billion 
over 10 years, and the United States agreed to give $20 billion over the same period 
(Edwards, 2009, p. 4).  
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Some critics of the program contended the Alliance for Progress was a failure 
because the goals were simply too ambitious.  It disregarded accountability and failed to 
account for the scope of the problems faced by Latin America. In the article Alliance for 
Progress: Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Tito Escobar, provides staggering figures, which 
illustrate the poor economic and social conditions of some Latin American countries 
during the early 1960s (Escobar, 2010, p. 5).  When the Alliance for Progress was 
implemented, adult illiteracy was as high as 70 percent.  Per capita income was only 
$200, and as many as 55 out of every 100 children died before the age of five.  As much 
as 90% of the land belonged to only 10% of the population.  The Latin American 
economy centered on the production of raw materials. To illustrate the desperate situation 
during this time, Escobar provides an example of the declining price of coffee.  A one-
cent decline in the international price of coffee generated a $50 million loss for Latin 
America. From 1954 to 1961, the price of coffee dropped more than 50%, resulting in an 
enormous decrease in the Latin America rate of growth.  During the 1940s, the growth 
rate was 3.5 percent.  By 1960, the year before the Alliance for Progress, it was less than 
1 percent.  Even with the injection of $20 billion, the proposed growth rate of 2.5% was 
never obtained, according to the author of Reflecting on an Alliance (Escobar, 2010, p. 
7).   
Escobar also provides data that point out the failure of the Alliance for Progress 
goal of land reform.  The emphasis placed on the monetary investment and the lack of 
U.S. involvement with land reform was a major flaw of the program.  Escobar compares 
the land reform program instituted in Mexico in the early 1920s to support his argument. 
Of the ten countries in which land reform had been implemented, five had previously 
failed land reform programs.  
Through the implementation of the four previously mentioned foreign policies, 
the United States developed a two-pronged approach of economic and military tactics to 
influence Latin American decision making.  The common themes of the policies were 




security through military and economic policy, tangible and immediate benefits for the 
Latin American countries, and the flexibility for the United States to adjust its position in 
accordance with the changing needs in the global arena.  
B. FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA AS A NATIONAL STRATEGY  
When delivering foreign aid to disadvantaged nations, the United States is the 
leader year after year in the total amount of money donated.  However, as a percent of 
Gross National Income, the United States finds itself in last place among major donating 
nations.  Scandinavian countries consistently lead, donating close to 1% of their Gross 
National Income to foreign aid efforts, while the United States donated 0.17% in 2006 
(Nowels, 2001, p. 1).  Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States shifted 
the focus of its foreign aid policy.  Former President Bush aligned global development 
with defense and diplomacy as the three pillars of national security.  Though the 
importance of foreign aid was emphasized in the United States National Security Strategy 
delineated in 2002 and again in 2006, Congress lately has scrutinized the methods in 
place.  Critics say that United States’ foreign aid system is “cumbersome and 
fragmented” and furthermore “unfocused” and requires reform (Veillette, 2006, p. 2). 
In June 2003, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) presented 
testimony evaluating the United States’ and Colombia’s combined efforts in the drug 
war.  Insurgent forces, primarily the FARC and the National Liberation Army, have 
enjoyed significant economic, political, and social power and influence in a majority of 
the country since the 1970s.  Given that approximately 90% of the cocaine and 40% of 
the heroin smuggled and sold in the U.S. comes from Colombia, the U.S. has partnered 
with South America to fund a robust counternarcotics strategy named Plan Colombia 
(Ford, 2003).     
Between years 2000–2003, the U.S. provided more than $2.5 billion to Colombia 
for counternarcotics assistance, including aid to the Colombian Army counternarcotics 
brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program in narcotics 
interdiction.  Despite this massive amount of financial assistance, Colombia remains the 
world’s principal producer of cocaine and a significant producer of heroin (Ford, 2003).   
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The mission of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs is to eradicate and interdict narcotics and create alternative methods of making a 
living for the ordinary citizens.  Their claim is that the narcotics trade inflicts a significant 
cost on the citizens of these foreign nations.   
C. HISTORY OF VIOLENCE: LA VIOLENCIA  
There is an old Columbian saying, “God made Colombia so beautiful, to equalize 
its beauty, he populated the country with the world’s most evil men (Anonymous).”  This 
saying is substantiated only by old folklore.  Yet, it does lead one to ask the question: 
why is Colombia such a violent country?  Over the past fifty years, Colombia has 
frequently been a leader in the number of murders, kidnappings, personal injuries, and 
displaced people.  Part of the answer lies in its history during the 1940s and 1950s, a 
period commonly known as La Violencia.  
La Violencia, is a traumatic undeclared civil war in Colombia’s history, ignited by 
the assassination of the Liberal party’s presidential candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, on 
April 9, 1948. Controversy surrounds Gaitan’s death, and many suspect members of the 
orthodox Liberals, Conservatives, or Communists.  However, Juan Roa Sierra, a Gaitan 
supporter, was charged with the slaying. Gaitan loyalists beat Sierra to death, and paraded 
his tattered body through the streets of Bogotá.  The ensuing violence initiated by the 
various political parties produced the most destructive and bloodiest riots in Latin 
American history (Safford & Palacios, 2001, p. 348).  
According to Safford and Palacious, hundreds of government buildings, stores, 
churches, homes, and automobiles were looted and burned (Safford & Palacios, p. 489).  
Rioters burned anything in their path as they marched to the presidential palace.  Sierra’s 
body and hundreds of others were left on the palace steps for President Mariano Ospina 
to view.  Similar demonstrations took place in many other Colombian cites.  The 
following morning, President Perez announced he reached an agreement with the Liberal 
party to form a bipartisan government (Safford & Palacios, 2001, p. 348). The agreement 
lasted less than a year due to increased partisanship and the violence that erupted again 
throughout Colombia.  These tragic events led to the signing of the National Front 
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Agreement of 1957.  Under this policy, both parties agreed to alternate the presidency 
and apportion political power (Marcella, 2003, p. 9).  The government’s effort to corral 
the violence engulfing the country actually created more problems and did little to reduce 
the killings.  The agreement removed the “spirit” of competition from politics and 
ultimately invited corruption to take its place.  As a result, the military was marginalized, 
corruption flourished, and the country was controlled by a few families until the 
constitution was passed in 1991 (Marcella, 2003, p. 9).  
1. Struggle for Power 
An estimated 40% of Colombia’s land mass is not controlled by the federal 
government.  For more than 50 years, the Colombian government competed with four 
other organizations for political authority and land.  The first was criminal gangs, which 
have no apparent agenda other than material gains from illegal activity, such as 
international drug trafficking.  In 2002, it was estimated that more than 162 drug firms 
operating in Colombia (Marcella, 2003, p. 9).  Also in 2002, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)) boasted 
17,000 to 18,000 members.  Third, the Self Defense Forces (Fuerzas de Autodefensa de 
Colombia – AUC) claimed 12,000 members.  Fourth, the National Liberation Army 
(Ejercito de Liberacion National – ELN) had approximately 5,000 members.  
Although the FARC and ELN were initially established as a revolutionary 
movement for social justice, today they receive very little recognition or tolerance from 
the international community.  In 2002, the FARC, ELN and AUC, were officially 
identified by the European Union as terrorist organizations that hampered Colombia’s 
progress towards peace and economic stability.  Since the early 1980s, the three 
organizations have relied on drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion to fund their 
efforts.  An estimated 90% of the FARC’s annual funding comes from illegal activity 
(Marcella, 2003, p. 9).  
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2. Weak Military  
The many years of corruption and distrust throughout the Colombian government 
encouraged lawmakers to seek a weak military.  The appeal of a weak military is not 
unique to Colombia. There are many instances throughout history of military-led coups 
taking political power.  Colombia’s government feared a coup and trickled only the basic 
sustaining resources into their military units.  The lack of adequate funding often leads to 
private companies paying for military protection.  However, the ability of a military 
commander to acquire funding from private sources is critical for promotion.  As 
Marcella states, “The institutional bias against the military impedes the nurturing of 
mutually supportive civil-military relations and development of the strategic instrument 
of legitimate coercive authority” (Marcella, 2003, p. 12). 
3. Strategic Importance of Colombia 
Colombia is a beautiful country, famous for its valuable ecosystem, world-
renowned coffee and Cumbia music. The country straddles the equator and has an area of 
more than 439,000 square miles, three times the size of Montana. Of the 300 million 
people living in the United States, it is estimated that more than 2.5 million are 
Colombian (Marcella, 2003, p. 4). Historically, the most populated areas of Colombia 
have been divided by its three mountain ranges, Cordiellera Oriental (Eastern Mountain 
Region), Cordiellara Central (central mountain region), and Cordiellera Occidentel 
(Western Mountain region). The division created by Colombia’s natural landscape also 
contributed to the delayed development of transportation and the formation of a national 
market.  It also led to the local and regional cultures, which some scholars claim 
contribute to the fragmentation and twentieth century intercommunity violence.  
As the fifth largest trading partner in Latin America for the United States, 
Colombia exchanges over $11 billion in goods with the U.S. annually.  Though this is 
only 0.077% of the United States’ Gross Domestic Product, Colombia’s security is 
important to the United States.  Its proximity to the Panama Canal, and Venezuela, the 
second largest exporter of oil to the United States, make it vital to stability in the region.  
Additionally, Venezuela has not shown friendly sentiment towards the United States in 
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recent years.  Colombia alone contains large coal and natural gas reserves and ranks fifth 
in oil exports in Latin America.  Therefore, every year the U.S. government spends more 
than $4 billion annually in Colombia to protect its national interest (Marcella, 2003, p. 3).   
Colombia’s internal problems of drug cultivation, corruption, violence, and 
ecological damage have expanded beyond its borders for many years.  According to 
Gabriel Marcella, the author of The United States and Colombia: The Journey from 
Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity, Colombia produces 90% of the cocaine that enters the 
United States and 70% of the world’s total (Marcella, 2003, p. 4).  Colombia is often 
referred to as the “kidnap capital of the world.”  In 2000, a record 2,400 kidnappings 
occurred in this violence-riddled country.  Violence has displaced 1.5 million Colombian 
citizens caught in the crossfire of shooting, and threats from the FARC and paramilitary 
groups.  
Colombia’s internal struggles represent an enormous threat to the international 
community.  Some scholars of the region utilize the broken window theory to support this 
claim.  
As Marcella writes: 
A “broken windows theory” of international relations would argue that the 
decline of a regional neighborhood threatens the international community 
in untraditional ways: international organized crime, the violation of 
sovereign borders contraband, the illegal shipment of arms, chemicals, 
laundering of dirty money, suborning of public officials (members of the 
police, military, legislative bodies, judiciaries, and so on), the corruption 
and intimidation of the media, displaced persons and the formation of an 
international demimonde within which terrorism breeds and intersects 
with organized crime. A January 2003 article in Bogata’s El Tiempo made 
this point in reporting that more than 50 Colombian criminal gangs, with 
perhaps a total of 2,000 members, were responsible for the robberies and 
narco-trafficking in Madrid, Spain. That country is home to more than 
400,000 Colombian diaspora (Marcella, p. 4).  Colombia’s instability not 
only threatens the basic human rights for its citizens and neighboring 
countries, but also threatens the ideals of democracy. With a failing 
economy and unemployment at record levels, confidence in the 
Colombian government is waning. As Colombian citizens watch the daily 
degradation of their beloved country, frustration with the current 
government swells. As a result, democracy as the preferred political form 
of government comes under pressure by leftist organizations promising 
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Utopia. The appeal of an alternate form of government has found 
momentum in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, as an increase in populist 
rhetoric has been noted in each country’s president’s recent comments. 
(Marcella, 2001, pp. 27–29) 
D. PLAN COLOMBIA 
In an effort to curtail the violence and combat the war on drugs that rages in 
Columbia, the United States embarked on a robust foreign aid program named Plan 
Colombia.  The plan is an aid initiative originally proposed by Colombian President 
Andres Pastrana in 1999, which included U.S. military/counter-narcotics aid, but was not 
limited to it.  
The plan has ten primary elements according to Gabriel Marcella (Marcella, 2003, 
p. 27): 
1. An economic strategy that generates employment supports the ability of 
the State to collect tax revenues and allows the country to have a viable 
counterbalancing economic force to narco-trafficking. The expansion of 
international trade, accompanied by enhanced access to foreign markets 
and free trade agreements to attract foreign and domestic investments, are 
key to the modernization of the U.S. economic base and to job creation. 
Such a strategy is crucial at a time when Colombia is confronting its worst 
economic crisis in 70 years, with unemployment running 20 percent, 
which in turn greatly limits the government’s ability to confront drug 
trafficking and the violence it generates.  
2. A fiscal and financial strategy that includes tough austerity and 
adjustments in order to boost economic activity and recover the 
historically excellent prestige of Colombia in the international financial 
markets. 
3. A peace strategy that aims at a negotiated peace agreement with the 
guerrillas on the basis of territorial integrity, democracy and human rights, 
which should further strengthen the rule of law and fight against drugs. 
4. A national defense strategy to restructure and modernize the armed 
forces and the police, so that they will be able to restore the rule of law 
and provide security in the country, to combat organized crime and armed 
groups and to protect and promote human rights and international 
humanitarian law.  
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5. A judicial and human rights strategy to reaffirm the rule of law and 
assure equal and impartial justice to all, while pressing ahead with the 
reforms already initiated in the forces of law and order to ensure that they 
play their proper role in defending and respecting the rights and dignity of 
all. 
6. A counternarcotics strategy, in partnership with other countries 
involved in some or all of the links of the drug chain: production, 
distribution, sale consumption, asset laundering, precursor chemicals, and 
arms dealing. And, at the national level, to stop the flow of drug money- 
the fuel of violence- to the insurgent and other armed organizations. 
7. An alternative development strategy that will promote agriculture 
schemes and other profitable economic activities for the present farmers 
and their families. Alternative development will also consider 
economically feasible environmental protection activities, designed to 
conserve the forest areas and end the dangerous expansion of illegal crops 
across the Amazon basin and Colombia’s vast national parks--areas of 
immense bio-diversity of vital environmental importance to the 
international community. Within this framework the strategy includes 
sustainable integrated, and participatory productive projects combined 
with the required infrastructure. Particular attention is to regions, which 
combine high levels of conflict with the low levels of State presences, 
social capital and serious environmental degradation, such as the middle 
Magdalena valley, the Macizo Colombiano, and the south west. 
8. A social participation strategy aimed at collective awareness. The 
strategy seeks to develop more accountability in local government, 
community involvement in anticorruption efforts, and continued pressure 
on the guerrillas and other armed groups to end kidnapping, violence and 
the internal displacement of individuals and communities. The strategy 
will also include cooperation with local business and labor groups, in 
order to promote innovation and productive models in the face of a more 
globalized economy. In addition, this strategy seeks to strengthen 
institutions, both formal and informal, to foster changes in the culture 
patterns through which violence develops and reinforces itself. It includes 
the promotion of mechanisms and educational programs to increase 
tolerance, the essential values for peaceful coexistence, and participation 




9. A human development strategy to promote efforts to guarantee, within 
the next few years, adequate education and health, to provide opportunities 
to every young Colombian and help vulnerable groups in our society, 
including not just those affected and displaced by violence but also those 
in conditions of extreme poverty. 
10. An international oriented strategy to confirm the principles of shared 
responsibility, integrated action and balanced treatment of the drug issue. 
The roles and support of the international community is also vital to the 
success of the peace process provided that it conforms to the terms of 
international law and is requested by the Colombian government.  
The policy options that Congress can consider are to maintain the broken status 
quo system, amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to reflect the goals, strategies, and 
programs able to combat the 21st century challenges, completely reorganize the current 
aid infrastructure to achieve current objectives, or end the assistance outright.  One of the 
possible changes is a realignment of the role of the Defense Department.  Its contribution 
to the United States’ foreign assistance budget has increased over recent years because of 
the stabilization and rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2001, the Defense 
Department funded 7% of the foreign assistance budget.  This ballooned to 20% in 2006.  
The department’s activities include disaster response, humanitarian assistance, 
development of capacity for foreign militaries, and counter-narcotics.  Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates stated that the Department of Defense needed to continue 
engagement in the reconstruction activities until the civilian agencies were strengthened 
and developed capacity.  Advocates for the increased Department of Defense 
involvement argue that the military is flexible and in the best position to use the resources 
to respond to crises as they arise.  However, critics argue that the reason Department of 
Defense presence is increased is because of a decrease in expertise of the USAID and 
Department of State personnel (Veillette, 2006).   
The majority of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs’ resources are divided into the Andean Counterdrug Programs (ACP) and 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).  Though the ACP 
supports Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Panama, the majority of the 
resources are used to combat the majority of the, which originates or passes through 
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Colombia.  The Bureau proposes to continue its progress in reducing the production and 
trafficking throughout the region by supporting the police forces and extending the 
support into the remote areas.  The funding supports the Critical Flight Safety Program, 
which supports the airborne eradication of coca in ensuring the aging winged fleet is 
upgraded to minimize future maintenance costs (State, 2008). 
Several barriers to success have already shown through in the United States’ and 
Colombian partnership.  Initially, the U.S. planned to transfer support for the helicopter 
program to the Colombian Army in 2006.  However, the Colombian government 
requested a continued level of assistance past this date due to the expectation of an 
insufficient amount of trained personnel and resources.  The Colombian National Police’s 
aerial eradication program, though well funded, has returned only mixed results (Ford, 
2003).  Though several dollars are infused into the country through illegal drug trade, the 
Colombian government’s financial resources are inadequate.  Neither the Army nor 
National Police can maintain this level of resistance against the drug lords without 
significant continued assistance from the U.S. and its contractor support base (Ford, 
2003). 
Colombia remains an unstable state politically and economically.  The FARC, 
National Liberation Army, and other drug war insurgents continue to represent a 
significant challenge to the governments’ efforts to quell the drug problem.  Additionally, 
the U.S. government’s aid carries the stipulations that Colombian government ensure: 
• Military and Police act in accordance with certain human rights standards 
• The aerial eradication program follows specific environmental conditions 
• The areas subject to the aerial eradication be provided an alternative 
means of subsistence. 
Since Colombia and the United States share significant trading ties and are 
longtime allies, the stability in the region economically and politically are very important 
to both nations.  The insurgents make it very difficult to access Colombia’s natural 
resources critical in the trade.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are drawing precious 
U.S. resources to combat terrorists in the Middle East region (Ford, 2003).   
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Colombia initially pledged $4 billion for Plan Colombia and called on the 
remainder of the international community to support with an additional $3.5 billion.  
Coupled with Colombia’s poor economic conditions, the international community’s lack 
of expected support left the program starved for financial subsistence.  The U.S. Embassy 
estimates that the Army and National Police’s counternarcotics programs will cost 
approximately $230 million annually, and neither the future cost, nor the future expected 
U.S. role in Colombia have been calculated yet.  Colombia cannot sustain this alone.  The 
U.S. Embassy reported that in 1998, the U.S. contractors and associated materials (e.g., 
fuel and herbicide) cost $48.5 million.  The 2003 reported figure for comparable services 
ballooned to an estimated $86.3 million and is expected to remain relatively constant in 
the future (Ford, 2003). 
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III. HISTORY OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 
A. HISTORY OF THE DRUG WAR FROM 1900 TO NIXON YEARS 
At the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. drug market was highly unregulated. 
Doctors routinely prescribed medication containing cocaine or heroin derivatives without 
fully understanding the harmful effects these drugs caused.  In 1906, the Pure Food and 
Drug Act targeted toxic drugs and established the Food and Drug Administration, which 
effectively gave the federal government the authority to regulate interstate drug 
commerce, followed by an expansion to address misleading drug labels in 1912.  
Congress passed the first federal criminal law in the War on Drugs with the 
Harrison Tax Act of 1914.  It restricted the sale of morphine and was later used to restrict 
the sale of cocaine as well.  Congress passed the law to criminalize the non-medical use 
of drugs.  The Harrison act applied only to morphine, cocaine and their derivatives.  
Other drugs, arguably as addictive and dangerous, (e.g., amphetamines, barbiturates, 
marijuana, and hallucinogens) were not included.  
The authors of the Harrison Tax Act wanted to regulate the medical use of these 
drugs and to criminalize the use of drugs for non-medical purposes.  They wanted to 
legislate this as two different tax policies.  The first policy was a one dollar per year tax 
for doctors.  Those who paid the tax were able to legally prescribe these drugs as long as 
they followed the regulations set by the government.  The second tax was a thousand 
dollars for every non-medicinal distribution of these drugs.  In 1914, an ounce of cocaine 
cost only a few dollars.  However, if someone was arrested with an ounce of cocaine, the 
crime would be tax evasion, not possession.  Nearly 100 physicians were convicted and 
imprisoned for violating the Harrison Tax Act (Carroll & McGuire, 2002, p. 13). Thus, 
the Harrison Act was not really a tax, but the start of prohibition in the United States for 
illicit drugs. 
The Harrison Act, like many regulations of its kind, had unintended 
consequences, the most dreadful of which was the creation of a black market for illegal 
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drugs.  The amount of traffic from the black market was nearly equal to the amount of 
legal medical traffic.  Drug dealers now had a developed network nationwide and even 
extended into smuggling drugs from other countries, including Canada and Mexico. 
There was an increase of addicts moving into larger cities where black markets were 
rapidly expanding.  
The 1922 Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act sought to eliminate the use of all 
narcotics, except in the legitimate use of medicines.  In 1924, the Heroin Act made it 
illegal to manufacture heroin or to use it for any reason.  Marijuana was added to the list 
of illicit drugs in 1937 when it was criminalized under the Marijuana Tax Act.  Between 
1937 and 1951, the focus of prohibition legislation was on establishing drug prescription 
guidelines, emphasizing drug safety and defining controls granted to the FDA.  The 
theme of prohibition changed dramatically, however, in 1951, when the federal 
government passed the Boggs Amendment to the Harrison Act.  This amendment 
established mandatory sentencing for narcotic violations and began a new emphasis on 
legislation to punish drug traffickers and users more severely.  Between 1951 and 1968, 
three of the four acts or amendments relating to illegal drugs passed set or increased 
criminal penalties for narcotics violations (Carroll & McGuire, 2002, p. 10).   
B. HISTORY OF THE DRUG WAR FROM NIXON TO PRESENT 
In 1969, President Richard Nixon identified drug abuse as “a serious national 
threat.” Noting a large increase in drug-related juvenile arrests and street crimes between 
1960 and 1967, Nixon directed federal and state officials to implement a national anti-
drug policy.  In 1970, the comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act, Title II, and 
Controlled Substance Act consolidated many previous drug laws.  Its primary objective 
was to categorize illicit drugs and to emphasize law enforcement (Timeline: America's 
War on Drugs, 2007, p. 1).  A year later President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs,” 
identifying drug abuse as “Public Enemy Number One.” In 1973, Nixon oversaw the 
renaming of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to the Drug Enforcement 
Agency, which continues to be the primary federal agency engaged in combating the war 
on drugs today. In contrast to Nixon’s staunch prohibition, President hopeful Jimmy 
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Carter campaigned on a platform that included legalizing marijuana and ending federal 
criminal penalties for possession of one ounce or less of the drug in 1975.  In 1977, 
President Jimmy Carter endorsed a federal decriminalization bill. However, the bill went 
nowhere, and soon the movement was all but obliterated by the return swing of the 
cultural pendulum, now known as the Reagan Revolution. There would be no new state 
or federal marijuana reforms for the next 16 years (Parloff, 2009, p. 2). 
The 1980s saw a large spike in the amount of cocaine use and imports, 
particularly from Colombian drug firms.  In 1984, First Lady Nancy Reagan launched the 
just say “Just Say No” campaign to convince American youths not to use drugs.  The goal 
of the program was to decrease demand for drugs by informing youth of its harmful 
effects before they became exposed to peer pressure to use them.  Critics of the program 
stated that the theme that drugs and drug abuse were everywhere was a hyperbole and not 
effective on children.  Findings showed that a survey conducted of 10 year-olds with a 
follow-up a decade later revealed no effects of the program.  According to the study, 
students exposed to the program were still just as likely to use illicit drugs and alcohol as 
those not exposed to the “Just Say No” curriculum (Reaves, 2001, p. 1).  
President Ronald Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, allocating 
$1.7 billion to combat drugs.  It imposed mandatory minima for sentencing for drug 
offences.  This was in response to the surge of crack cocaine, a cheap alternative to 
powdered cocaine in a crystallized form, in major metropolitan areas.  The Act was a 
source of subsequent controversy because of the disparity between the punishments for 
crack cocaine vice powdered cocaine.  Critics claim that it promoted great racial 
disparities between the prison populace due to the harsher sentence for the cheaper form 
of cocaine because the typical crack user is of a lower income level.   Though the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission released a report publicly acknowledging the racial disparities 
between the prison sentencing policies and recommended reducing the discrepancy, 
Congress overrode the recommendation (Timeline: America's War on Drugs, 2010, p. 3).   
The United States and Colombian relationship has been one of mixed feelings.  
Drug warlords have been extradited to the U.S. to stand trial.  In February 1987, Carlos 
Lehder was captured and extradited, then convicted of drug smuggling charges in a U.S. 
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court.  Subsequently, he was sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole, 
in addition to another 135 years for his crime.  Later that year in May, however, the 
Colombian Supreme Court ruled to annul the extradition treaty with the United States.  
This occurred after a number of justices received personal threats on their lives from drug 
traffickers (Timeline: America's War on Drugs, 2010, p. 3).  In 1991, the Colombian 
assembly voted, in its new constitution, to ban extradition and notorious kingpin, Pablo 
Escobar turned himself in to the Colombian Authorities afterward, on the same day.  
Then, he was confined to a private luxury prison, where it was well known that he 
traveled as he pleased into and out of the facility (Timeline: America's War on Drugs. 
2010, p. 4). When the Colombian government attempted to quell his prison freedoms, he 
escaped and went on the lam in 1992.  Finally, Escobar was killed in 1993 due to the 
combined efforts of the American and Colombian governments (Timeline: America's 
War on Drugs, 2010, p. 5).     
In August of 2000, President Clinton pledged $1.3 billion to the Plan Colombia 
program to decrease the supply of cocaine produced in that country.  The focus on 
decreasing supply led to support of the aerial eradication of coca crops, other air assets 
and training for the Colombian military (Timeline: America's War on Drugs, 2010, p. 5).   
President George W. Bush furthered the U.S. government’s dedication to the drug 
war in the Andean Regional Initiative.  He dedicated $882 million in FY 2002 in support 
of “democratic institution building and development assistance, as well as counter-drug 
programs in the seven countries included in the initiative: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela (Woolley & Peters, p. 1).”  Leaders from the 
seven nations met with President Bush to appeal for aid, with almost half of the aid being 
distributed to Colombia.  President Bush believed that due to the drug demand from the 
United States, it was the nation’s responsibility to stand with these countries to combat 




In 2009, the head of White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gil 
Kerlikowske, wanted to banish the idea that the U.S. was fighting a “War on Drugs.”  His 
position as the “Drug Czar” set the policy in the direction of a more moderate tone, with 
less of a criminal justice approach.  His method was geared towards treatment of 
offenders as addicts.  He said, “Regardless of how you try to explain to people it's a 'war 
on drugs' or a 'war on a product,' people see a war as a war on them…We're not at war 
with people in this country (Fields, 2009, p. 1). 
 28
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 29
IV. COST TO COLOMBIA 
A. SECURITY ISSUES 
Colombia is one of the oldest settlements in Latin America, yet its porous borders 
and ungoverned internal territories pose a significant threat not only to the international 
community, but also to Colombia’s own people. In many parts of the country, the federal 
government is nonexistent. In 2002, an estimated 40% of Colombia’s land mass was not 
controlled by the federal government (Marcella, 2003, p. 3). For security, many 
Colombian citizens often pay a fee for this basic need to one of Colombia’s guerilla 
groups in exchange for protection. Oddly, it is the guerilla groups that create the violence 
that Colombians are paying to avoid.  With the AUC disbanding and the ELN posing less 
of a threat, the FARC is blamed for most armed insurrection against the government. 
However, less than ten years ago, powerful drug cartels and guerilla groups made 
security fees a requirement for most occupations, especially drug trafficking.  
1. Colombia‘s Illegal Drug Firms 
The first were the Medellin and Cali drug firms, which were led by kingpins 
Pablo Escobar and the Orejuela brothers, respectively.  Both started out with modest 
goals, initially shipping suitcases of marijuana and small amounts of cocaine to the 
United States.  However, the more lucrative profits from cocaine soon caused shipments 
of cocaine to dominate the drug routes. In the early 1980s, a kilo of cocaine could be 
processed for $1,500 in the rural labs of Putumayo and sold on the streets of Miami for as 
much as $50,000. What started out as a small cocaine smuggling business quickly turned 
into a multi-billion dollar international empire. The astounding profits attracted a mix of 
individuals, from politicians and legitimate businessman, to life-long street thugs 
claiming allegiance to one or another firm. The firm leaders invested heavily in political 
protection. The former president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, and hundreds of 
Congressmen and Senators have been accused of accepting campaign financing from the 
once dominant firms (Frontline, 2010, p. 1).    
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The reader will notice we have been careful not to use the term cartel, as many 
publications often uses to describe illegal drug firms. The term “cartel” refers to a small 
number of firms, which collude via a formal agreement to set price and production 
quantity. This was not the business model for the powerful Colombian drug firms of the 
1990s.  One reason for the downfall of the drug firms was the fierce competition between 
the two rivals. In an effort to acquire a larger part of the market, the Cali organization 
began to attack the Medellin firm.  Members of the Cali cartel started to supply the 
United States and Colombian governments’ information about Escobar’s business actions 
and contacts. They eventually formed the People Against Pablo Escobar (Los PEPES), 
which specifically targeted Escobar’s homes, businesses, lieutenants and family. Several 
of Escobar’s homes and businesses were bombed and top lieutenants killed by the Los 
Pepes. By the mid-1990s, the leaders of the Medellin and Cali cartels were either dead or 
in prison courtesy of the Colombian National Police and aided by the U.S. government 
(Frontline, 2010, p. 1).  
The large drug firms that dominated drug exports hired small armies for 
protection against law enforcement agencies, competitors and possible extortionists. The 
armies were also used to intimidate politicians, prevent newcomers from entering the 
market, and protect their own investments, particularly rural land. The fall of the once 
dominant drug firms left the cocaine business fragmented. Today, drug traffickers realize 
large drug firms in the late 1990s were high value targets for the Colombian and United 
States authorities. Therefore, smaller, more controllable, compartmentalized groups are 
utilized. One group may be responsible for smuggling the drugs from Colombia to 
Mexico. Another group oversees the coca paste production in the jungle labs. Another 
transports the cocaine from the labs to the point of debarkation. According to the 
Colombian National Police, there are more than 300 active drug smuggling organizations 
today (Frontline, 2010, p. 2).  
2. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) 
While the Medellin and Cali cartels chose to develop their own protection 
services, today’s smaller drug smuggling organizations are forced to pay security fees to 
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the FARC guerrillas.  The links between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) and drug smuggling organizations cannot be disputed. The FARC, a 
Colombian Marxist guerilla group, provides protection to the coca fields and production 
labs in the southeastern region of Colombia in exchange for taxes that the drug smugglers 
pay the organization.  The expansion of the cocaine trade has allowed the FARC to 
protect coca growers and extort traffickers (Senlis Council, 2006, p. 68). 
In an effort to reduce the violence between the Colombian National Police, 
paramilitaries and the FARC guerrillas, the Pastrana administration gave the FARC 
control of more than 40,000 hectares of land in 1998. It is no coincidence this area was 
located in the southeastern part of the country that is ideal for growing coca. First, to gain 
allegiance from the local coca growers, the FARC negotiated a minimum price for their 
crops. Then they established tax rates for every stage from coca planting to the 
exportation of cocaine out of the area they control (Senlis Council, 2006, p. 49).  
Although the FARC was initially established under a revolutionary movement for 
“social justice,” today they receive very little recognition or tolerance from the 
international community. Both the United States and the European Union added the 
FARC to their lists of terrorist organizations in 2002. Since the early 1980s, they have 
relied on drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion to fund their efforts.  David 
Henderson reports, the FARC received more that $600 million in 2001 from the drug 
related sources (Henderson, 2003, p. 1). 
An unintended consequence of the destruction of the large drug firms and 
providing safe-havens for the FARC has been the empowerment of warlords and 
guerrillas at the expense of drug traffickers in large parts of the country. The extended 
period of violence has caused Colombia to appear at the top of most human rights 




3. National Liberation Army (ELN) 
The National Liberation Army (ELN), a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, was 
also indentified as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department in 2002. The 
ELN, like most of Colombian guerrilla groups, roots can be traced to the period known as 
La Violencia. And like the FARC, the ELN was founded, in part, by liberals and other 
guerillas that refused to disarm at the end of the hostilities.  
ELN supporters were primarily petroleum workers of the Middle-Magdalene 
region and one of its historic causes has been to protect Colombian oil from foreign 
exploitation. In the 1980s, the ELN joined forces with the FARC, to form the National 
Guerrilla Coordinator (CNG). While the CNG still exists nominally, the ELN is largely 
independent of the FARC. The ELN’s end strength, primarily concentrated in the North 
of Colombia, has declined from 5,000 in 1998 to 2500 members today.  They were 
notorious for executing massive kidnapping operations.  In 1999, the ELN captured 143 
during a church ceremony and two years later hijacked a Venezuelan commercial airliner 
(Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN, 2002, p. 19). 
4. United Self-Defense Force of Colombia (AUC) 
The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), perhaps Colombia’s most violent 
terrorist organization, was created in 1997, under a right-wing umbrella of paramilitaries 
in Colombia. Its primary objective was to protect its sponsors and supporters from 
insurgents and their activities. Their sponsors are often indentified as ranchers, farmers, 
mining, and petroleum companies. In 2001, they were added to both the U.S. and 
European Union terrorist list. 
Unlike the FARC and ELN, which were initially motivated by political and social 
goals, the motivation of the AUC has consistently been monetary gain. In 2000, the AUC 
was also thought to be involved in the illegal drug trade, controlling drug fields, labs and 




Colombian National Police reports that in the first ten months of 2000 the AUC 
conducted 804 assassinations, 203 kidnappings, and 75 massacres with 507 victims 
(Kouri, 2008, p. 2).  
The AUC repeatedly claimed their victims were left-wing geurrilla members or 
sympathizers.  However, in February 2005, the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor reported the AUC was accused of 342 violations. The violations 
included massacres, forced displacement, selective and systemic homicide, kidnappings, 
rape, threats, intimidation and lootings (U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, p. 1). Some scholars of Colombia’s internal conflict believe the AUC, in its later 
years, was largely funded by the Colombian Army. Tom Driver author of the Colombia’s 
Drug War writes, “More recently they have been employed by the Colombian army to do 
the dirty work of terrorizing the campesinos and community leaders… (Driver, 2001, p. 
3).” He goes on to write, “Not long ago the Colombian army had one of the worst records 
of human rights abuses in the Americas. Recently it appears to have delegated this kind 
of brutality to the paramilitaries, who committed atrocities on its behalf. U.S. military aid 
to Colombia indirectly subsidizes the paramilitaries’ act of terrorism” (Driver, 2001, p. 
4).  Between 1999 and 2005, the Colombian army was accused of collaborating with the 
ACU and other paramilitaries to carry out various violent tasks. Former President Uribe 
was subpoenaed earlier this year to give testimony in a civil case filed by victims of 
paramilitary violence against U.S. coal giant Drummond (Aselma, 2010, p. 1). 
B. INVESTMENT BY THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT 
Fortunately, for the United States, the War on Drugs in Colombia is not a 
unilateral U.S. effort.  Over the last two decades, the Colombian government has shown a 
strengthened resolve to eradicate drugs from their country.  Though the United States 
provided approximately USD $4 billion in assistance to Colombia from 1999 to 2005, the 
Colombian government spent nearly USD $7 billion, in addition to the $4 billion from 
the United States, during the same time span.  The Colombian Government intends to 
spend approximately USD $44 billion in support of the “Strategy to Strengthen  
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Democracy and Promote Social Development” between the years of 2007 and 2013.  The 
U.S. intends to spend approximately $3.9 billion during the same period of time (Shapiro, 
2007, p. 4). 
United States’ funds in FY 2008 were cut by USD $166 million.  These 
reductions resulted in 5,761 flight hours less for interdiction and 12,094 flight hours less 
for aerial spraying and annual eradication.  Since the pilots had fewer hours, the 
government experienced decreased capability to reach the desolate areas where territorial 
control was lacking (Colombia and The United States Building a Strategic Partnership, p. 
9). 
In FY 2010, the Colombian government increased its security and defense 
significantly.  The General Comptroller, Fernando Jiminez, caveats that the money 
allocated to “democratic security” has been decreased.  He also states that a significant 
portion of the budget is dedicated to health care and pensions for military and police 
members.  Regardless, the Security and Defense line item was approximately USD $11.1 
million for the year.  Jiminez’s critics disapprove that the Colombian Department of 
Defense will receive 14.2% of the 2010 Colombian budget, (Plan Colombia and Beyond, 
p. 1), which surpassed the 13.9% spent for the first time.  Colombia’s investment in 
higher education of 0.4% of GDP is far lower than the international average of 1.2% 
(EFE News, 2009, p. 1). 
C. DISPLACED PERSONS 
Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world, due to its 
excessive violence over the years.  In 2008, it was estimated that 380,000 people became 
newly displaced (House Resolution on Colombian Internally Displaced Persons, 2010, p. 
1). According to the Colombian government, over 122,000 were newly displaced for 
2009.  This escalated the governmental estimate of displaced population to over 3.3 
million.  The Commission for the Human Rights and Forced Displacement (Consultoría 




government’s numbers are deflated.  They estimate that over 286,000 people were newly 
displaced in 2009, bringing the total displacement to over 4.9 million people (Internal 
Displacement in the Americas, 2010, p. 1).   
As Colombia makes strides to become a respected nation in the international 
arena, its problem with displacement provides a large stumbling block.  The nation’s 
Constitutional Court notes that 92% of displaced persons cannot meet their basic needs.  
Of these displaced persons, 80% of them are indigent, and 63.5% have substandard 
housing. Forty-nine percent lack access to public services. Twenty-three percent of 
children under six are malnourished, and a quarter of all youth between 10 and 25 years 
old are not enrolled in schools.  Since these citizens are destitute, they will often turn to 
crime to feed themselves and their families (Vieira, 2010, p. 1).   
Between 1995 and 2002, Colombia spent USD $292 million to combat the 
problem of displaced persons.  Between 2003 and 2007, they spent USD $1.45 billion.  
This represents almost a 400% increase in program growth over the 12 years in then-year 
dollars.  The Colombian government estimates an additional USD $2.1 billion will be 
spent to assist displaced persons between 2007 and 2011 (Building a Strategic 
Partnership, p. 6).  
D. INCENTIVE IN THE COCA TRADE 
The eradication efforts restrict the ability of peasant farmers to make a significant 
living for their families.  In a country where approximately 47% of the population is 
below the poverty line and 18% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture work, farmers 
are looking for ways to ensure a livelihood.  Reporter Lisa Ling interviewed Colombian 
citizens from coca farmers to then-President Alvaro Uribe.  The sentiment of one farmer 
responding to why he continued to grow coca, knowing that it harmed people was “…it 
doesn’t do any damage here.  If we don’t grow it, our families don’t eat.”  As she stood in 
the middle of 20,000 coca plants, Lisa Ling explained that farmers would need just two 
acres of land to cultivate the crops.  Those farmers would earn USD $12,000 selling their 
coca plants.  Conversely, the farmer who chose to use his land for coffee would require 
four times as much land but would earn only USD $3,000 (Ling, 2003).  In a nation 
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where the per capita GDP was estimated at USD $9,200 in 2009, the coca farmer will 
naturally attempt to earn approximately 30% above the average rather than approximately 
67% below the average.   
When speaking with a man who was caught smuggling coca from Colombia, Ling 
learned that though the governments spend an enormous amount of effort on interdiction, 
much of the drug output produced in Colombia still make it to the United States.  
Elaborate medical-grade body scanners, searches, and personal interviews are used at 
airports prior to departure from the country.  However, the smuggler revealed that of 
twenty shipments of cocaine sent from Colombia, around six or seven will be caught, 
while the remainder makes it to the United States (Ling, 2003).   
E. AIRCRAFT 
In 2008, the Colombian Government took ownership of the aircraft maintained 
and supported by U.S. dollars.  This process began with thirteen U.S. government 
controlled aircraft (House Resolution on Colombian Internally Displaced Persons, 2010, 
p. 5). It further expanded to assuming the operational costs for 21 aircraft and the fuel 
costs for all U.S.-titled aircraft for a total cost of $23 million.  These aircraft are strictly 
regulated through a Letter of Agreement between governments whereby they can be 
utilized only for counternarcotics interdiction.  Any other use (e.g., humanitarian 
assistance or aiding in natural disasters) must first receive explicit clearance from the 
U.S. Embassy.  The Colombian Government presented a proposal to the U.S. Department 
of State for a nationalization program through 2012 (Colombia and The United States 
Building a Strategic Partnership, 2010, p. 10).  This change to Colombian ownership 
program will entail the Colombian government advancing to total ownership of, and 
control over, the aircraft.    
F. AERIAL ERADICATION 
The Aerial Eradication portion of the Plan Colombia budget is the largest line 
item other than aviation procurement.  The Narcotics Affairs Section spent over 18% 
($72 million) of its 2007 budget on Aerial Eradication (Embassy of the United States, 
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Bogota, Colombia, 2007, p. 3).  The initial stages of Plan Colombia called for a barrage 
of coca plant eradication by air; however, various interest groups met this method with 
great resistance.  The herbicides used significantly damaged the ground for all crops to 
grow and harmed the population in those areas.1  On the other hand, the coca growers are 
not without fault.  The coca farmers also greatly harm the environment by practicing 
environmentally damaging techniques.  Their cultivation methods cause deforestation 
because many of the precursor chemicals and herbicides end up in rivers and streams.  
The farmers also practice a method known as “slash and burn,” destroying large tracts of 
forest, wildlife, and ecosystems in order to make room for the coca crop.  Finally, the 
coca plant extracts vital nutrients from the soil, which hinders crop rotation since the 
replacement crops cannot thrive in the nutrient-depleted areas (Peru, Coca Trade, and 
Environment, p. 1). 
Each year, in accordance with the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002, the U.S. Secretary 
of State must certify that the chemicals used in the herbicides do not pose a human or 
environmental risk (Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca in Colombia, 2007, p. 1).  As was 
determined in 2004, in accordance with Colombian laws, the Colombian Minister of the 
Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development asserted the illicit crop eradication 
program is being conducted in compliance with the Environmental Management Plan for 
aerial eradication (EMP). Therefore, no significant changes in the execution of the illicit 
crop eradication or the EMP have been made.  The final resolution of a 2002 class-action 
lawsuit against the Aerial Eradication Program was a ruling that the program was 
compliant with the Colombian laws governing aerial eradication (Bureau of INLE, 2007, 
p. 1).  The Colombian Administrative Tribunal concluded that it could not be accurately 
inferred that the glyphosate, one of the herbicides, caused irreversible damage to the 
environment in the process of eradicating the illicit crops.  It also claimed that many areas 
of forest were also destroyed when trees were felled by the illicit crop growers (Bureau of 
INLE, 2007, p. 1).     
                                                 
1 Many of the effects of the chemicals are respiratory, skin, and gastrointestinal in nature.  These are 
thought to be from the additive Cosmoflux (“The Failed ‘Drug War’,” p. 1).  
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In 2003 through 2006, the U.S. Secretary of State certified that herbicide mixture, 
in the manner it is being used, did not pose unreasonable population or environmental 
effects.  The U.S. State Department and Colombian Government consulted the EPA and 
incorporated the EPA’s recommendations to strengthen the program controls and protect 
against the adverse effects on the environment and humans (Bureau of INLE, 2007, p. 2).   
In addition, the U.S. Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and the Colombia National 
Police (CNP) collected and analyzed almost 80 water and 180 soil samples drawn from 
sprayed areas throughout Colombia in 2003–2006.  The samples were taken before, 
immediately after, and sixty days after spraying during various aerial eradication 
campaigns.  The studies also determined that the chemical residue did not adversely 
affect the soil of the coca plants.  The chemicals did not also adversely affect the water 
taken from the streams adjacent to the sprayed crops.  The conclusions were reviewed by 
the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in a two-year risk assessment of the human and environmental 
effects related to the aerial eradication (Bureau of INLE, 2007, p. 3).   
Though the studies have found the chemicals generally not harmful to humans or 
the environment, the Colombian Government received several complaints and claims to 
fairly compensate the claimants.  The Colombian Government instituted a process in 
October 2001 to compensate the growers for legal crops that were sprayed in error.  From 
the inception of the program to 2007, 43 cases, totaling USD $195,000 in compensation 
were awarded.  The verification of these claims is also very expensive.  The eradication 
program spent over USD $100,000 in May 2006 investigating 75 cases alleging sprayed 
African palm near Nariño.  In every case, coca plants were found interspersed with the 
palm (Bureau of INLE, 2007, p. 4).   
G. TOTAL COST TO COLOMBIA 
Colombia’s internal conflict, fueled by the war on drugs, has cost Colombia 
tremendously. The loss of life and human rights violations statistics are staggering for a 
country about three times the size of Montana. One estimate is that more than 120,000  
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people have been killed since 1964, due to the violence initiated by Colombia’s feuding 
cartels and terrorist groups (World: Americas Millions March for Colombia Peace, 1999, 
p. 1).  
To calculate the total cost the war on drugs has had on Colombia is difficult since 
indirect costs should also be considered. It would not be a stretch to claim Colombia’s 
decades of instability has cost the country several billion dollars and thousands of jobs 
that would have been created by more foreign investment in petroleum, mining, and 
tourism industries. Colombia’s oil reserves, wealth of natural resources and beautiful 
coastline could produce substantial revenue for Colombia’s struggling economy and 
create jobs to help reduce its current unemployment rate of 12.8% (Colombia 
Unemployment Rate, 2010, p. 1).  
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V. ANALYSIS  
A. STRATEGY AND FUNDING MISMATCH 
Though the United States has been engaged in a drug war for the past four 
decades, the effort to eradicate drugs has been unsuccessful.  The problem requires an 
enormous amount of time and resources.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
estimates that spending on drugs worldwide was estimated in 2002 to be $400 billion 
dollars.  Adjusted for inflation, this would be equivalent to $470.4 billion today (McGuire 
& Carroll, p. 36).  The head of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
Gil Kerlikowske, acknowledges that the problem has even “magnified” and “intensified” 
(Associated Press, 2010, p. 1).  When Mr. Kerlikowske was nominated and accepted the 
office in March 2009, his intent was to focus on outreach to those addicted to drugs 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2009, p. 1).  However, the Congress has not appropriated funds 
for rehabilitation. This makes it impossible for Mr. Kerlikowske to achieve the 
administration’s goals.  The health care ramifications resulting from the increased focus 
on prohibition and prosecution are an indirect cost as well.   
Health Cost 
The health care cost resulting from the prohibition of drugs is a complex problem.  
It is difficult to discern what harm is attributed to prohibition or simply irresponsible drug 
use.  For instance, the date gathered by medical professionals can be skewed in favor of 
specific special interests (McGuire & Carroll, p. 36).  Therefore, the true cost of the 
health care for drug users is unknown. 
According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the cumulative estimated 
number of cases of AIDS, excluding HIV positive cases, through 2008 in the United 
States is 1,073,128 cases.  Of these cases, 267,391, or approximately 25%, are due to 
injection drug use (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010, p. 7).   
HIV/AIDS patients are threatened by infection by tuberculosis since tuberculosis 
attacks the weak immune system.  The drug users are susceptible to TB infection at a 
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high rate because certain treatment barriers, including lack of adherence and limited 
access to care, exacerbate the challenges for treatment (Deiss et al., 2008, p. 7).  A 
number of studies examining various cross-sections of the drug using population have 
characterized latent tuberculosis prevalence up to 59% in some groups (Deiss et al., p. 2).  
These studies have shown mixed results among injecting and non-injecting drug users.  
This indicates a similar risk between both groups (Deiss et al., 2008, p. 7).   
B. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS 
John Carnevale, an economist who worked at the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy under three presidents, criticized the Bush administration’s Merida Initiative that 
was supposed to also emphasize treatment because the budget—allocated for 
interdiction—did not align with the goal of rehabilitation. Mr. Kerlikowske’s tenure so 
far has not proved any different, however.  A year and a half after appointing Mr. 
Kerlikowske as the drug czar, President Obama continued to promise to reduce the use of 
drugs by treating it as more of a public health issue with a focus on treatment and 
prevention.  Yet, the administration continues to increase spending on interdiction and 
law enforcement.  Figure 2 illustrates the funds spent in support of domestic and abroad 
interdiction and law enforcement versus the prevention and treatment budgetary line 
items.  The promises and goals do not align with the program funding.  As a result, the 
goals will not become realized if interdiction and law enforcement accounted for $10 
billion out of the $15.5 billion budget for drug control in 2010.  The War on Drugs 
abroad is as complicated as it is domestically.  However, the current strategy, embraced 
by both dominant political parties, is not what has received the monetary support 




Figure 2.   Comparison of U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Spending 
Function: (From: Executive Office of the President, Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, p. 1) 
A reduction in the funds spent in Colombia, particularly for procurement and training, 
and subsequent redirection to manage the United States’ demand for illicit narcotics is 
needed.  After ten years of United States assistance, the Colombian government has 
reached a point where they are self-sustainable.  They have the will to continue 
combating the drug problem with minimal support.  It will benefit the United States 
politically and fiscally to greatly reduce its footprint in Colombia to allow them to 
maintain their own solution.  The United States will be able to accept the Colombian 
success as a foreign policy accomplishment and the Colombian government can fully 
assume ownership of their internal issues.  This recommendation is not to eliminate all 
ties with Colombia, because both countries can benefit from a mutual trade partnership.  
However, it is a proposal to align the national spending in accordance with the strategy 
set forth by Mr. Kerlikowske to create a lasting effect on the drug demand.   
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C. ERADICATION EFFORTS 
In 2002, Colombia’s coca eradication efforts began to exceed its coca cultivation 
(see Figure 3).  Due to the balloon effect, eradication failed to accomplish its primary 
goal of reducing coca cultivation for the region. The balloon effect is a term that refers to 
the squeezing of one part of the balloon, only to see a bulge in another area. This term is 
often used to describe illicit drug cultivation migrating from one area to a less enforced 
area making it more difficult interdict and eradicate.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Columbia, Coca Cultivation and Reported Eradication/Spraying (ha), 
1994–2008 (From: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009, 
198). 
Colombia’s total coca cultivation deceased by 18% to 81,000 hectares in 2008 
and 16% to 68,000 in 2009. Over the last decade Colombia’s coca cultivation decreased 
by 60 percent. The largest decreases have occurred in the Meta-Guaviare, Putumayo-
Caquetá and Orinoco regions, while the Pacific region continues to report high 
production numbers annually.  In 2008, the Pacific region led the nation’s coca 
cultivation with 29,920 ha or 38% (see Figure 4).  Additionally, increases in police and 
military units allow Colombia to conduct more manual eradication operations and less of 
the controversial aerial fumigation. In 2009, Colombian authorities increased manual 
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eradication by 43% and reached a record high of 95,634 hectares eradicated.  However, 
the successes in reducing Colombia’s production have had unintended, but totally 
predictable, consequences elsewhere:  Both Peru and Bolivia have seen an increase in 




Figure 4.   Columbia, Coca Cultivation by Region (From: United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2009, p. 201) 
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1. Peru 
Peru will possibly reclaim its 1980s title as world largest exporter of cocaine (see 
Figure 5). For the fourth consecutive year, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. In 2009, 
coca cultivation increased by 6.8% to 59,900 in 2009, from 56,100 ha in 2008 (House 
Resolution on Colombian Internally Displaced Persons, 2007, p. 3). Over the past decade 
coca cultivation increased by more than 55 percent. Along with the resurgence of the 
coca bush, violent crimes by Peru’s Maoist rebel group, the Shining Path, are on the rise. 
In April 2010, they killed two eradicators and one police officer in central Peru. The 
Shining Path was once 10,000 members strong and terrorized the country during the 
1980s with car bombings, assassinations and brazen attacks on police and military 
outposts (S. Romero, 2010, p. 1). 
 
 
Figure 5.   Global Coca Bush Cultivation (ha), 1990–2009 (From: United Nations 




Coca cultivation has also reemerged in Bolivia since 2001 (see Figure 6).2  In 
2007, coca cultivation increased in Bolivia by 6% to 30,500 hectares, the third 
consecutive annual increase.  Bolivia’s president, a former coca farmer, promotes a “zero 
cocaine, but not zero coca” policy, which stymied eradication efforts in the country.  
Additionally, the coca leaf’s deep roots in Bolivia’s culture and its cultivation for 
alternative products, such as toothpaste, chewing gum, tea, and crackers, have further 
obstructed the U.S. eradication strategy for the Andean region. Though Bolivia’s 
president claims that coca grown in Bolivia will not yield cocaine, according to U.N. 
figures, both legal and illegal coca-leaf production are growing. The latest figures put the 
harvest in 2008 at about 30,350 hectares, far above the limit of 12,100 hectares set in a 
1988 Bolivian law. Although, Bolivia’s annual cocaine production is far less than 
Colombia’s and Peru’s, there are signs that the drug trade is expanding. In 2010, Bolivian 
police raided a cocaine lab capable of producing 220 pounds of cocaine a day, a Bolivian 
street value of more than $5 million3 (Regalado, 2009, p. 1). 
                                                 
2 From 1994 to 2002, the data provided is directly from the U.S. Department of State.  The data from 
2002 through 2008 is provided by the National Monitoring System, which derives data from the respective 
government, but is supported by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 
3 This number seems high because the street value in Bolivia would be much lower than the street 
value in, say, New York, because the risky transport from Bolivia to the United States, which adds 
substantially to the price, would be avoided.  In 2007, a gram of pure cocaine cost anywhere from $97 to $137 
in the U.S.  Using the DEA’s figures 220 lbs of pure cocaine would yield anywhere from $9.7M to $13.7M and 
so the street value in Bolivia would probably have been a small fraction of that number.  It's possible that the 
street value was estimated at low U.S. prices, which is, of course, a misleading way of estimating. 
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Figure 6.   Bolivia, Coca Cultivation (ha), 1994–2009 (From: United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, 2009. p. 195). 
D. REDUCTION IN VIOLENCE 
Although Colombia continues to appear at the top of most violent crime reports, 
the drug related violence that led Colombia to earn the title “kidnap capital of the world,” 
and “win the silver medal” for the most displaced people, only behind Sudan, has 
diminished drastically (Internal Displacement in the Americas, 2010, p. 1).  Human rights 
groups’ statistics on displaced persons vary widely. However, they all indicate a 
substantial decline in Colombia over the last decade. In January 2010, Jacob 
Kellenberger, president of the Red Cross, told former President Alvaro Uribe, that the 
number of displaced persons had dropped by more than 50% between 2008 and 2009 (see 
Figure 7). Another report published by the human rights group CODHES found there was 
a 24% drop in the number of displaced Colombians in 2009.  Kellenberger's statistic is 
similar to that given by Colombia’s social security director, Diego Molano, who recently 
claimed that there was a 56% decrease in displacement in 2009 (Colombia’s Displaced 































Figure 7.   Dynamics of the Displacement in Columbia (From: Colombian 
Government, National Observatory of Forced Displacement, 2009) 
Additionally, the murder rate for Colombia has dropped significantly. According to 
Police Chief General Oscar Naranjo, Colombia’s homicide rate has been on a steady 
decline since 2002 (Sumpter, 2010, p. 1).  In 2006, Pablo Escobar’s hometown of 
Medellin, Colombia’s murder rate was actually lower than in Washington, D.C., Detroit 
and Baltimore (International Policy Report, Plan Colombia- Six Years Later).  
E. COLOMBIA TODAY 
The restoration of relative piece within Colombia is due primarily to the “iron-
fisted” leadership of Colombia’s former president Alvaro Uribe.  President Uribe’s tough 
security policies increased the number of police and military present in once lawless 
villages and slums throughout the country.  Additionally, his willingness to negotiate 
with both left-wing and right-wing terrorist groups led to the demobilization of the AUC, 
Colombia’s most violent terrorist group. Negotiations have also proven fruitful with the 
left-wing Guevarista Revolutionary Army (ERG), a splinter group of the larger ELN.  
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In August 2008, President Uribe negotiated a deal with the last 45 members of the 
ERG. Although talks between the Colombian government and the guerilla organizations 
have historically provided no resolution to the decades of violence, comments made by 
ERG leader, Olimpo Sanchez Caro, indicate the world’s oldest terrorist groups may be 
ready to negotiate a peace settlement. Caro stated, 
The world has changed and we cannot remain indifferent to the changes in 
Colombia.  Ten or fifteen years ago, the people applauded the armed 
struggle in Colombia.  Now they reject it. When I joined, you could move 
around freely in and out of villages. Now the army is all around, and the 
local population is afraid to help us. (McDermott, 2010, p. 1) 
Colombia is clearly a safer place than it was only a decade ago. President Uribe’s 
“Democratic Security” strategy, in addition to U.S. foreign aid programs, such as Plan 
Colombia, has caused a significant drop in murder rates, displaced people and 
kidnappings. Increased security forces have allowed the government to reclaim large 
portions of the nation’s territory once occupied by the FARC and ELN guerillas. 
Colombians are now experiencing the peace that they have sought for more than fifty 
years because of Colombia’s better trained, equipped, and capable army, and the 
increasingly negative sentiment toward guerillas among the local populace. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States is still recovering from the greatest recession since the Great 
Depression.  However, the recession served as a catalyst for the U.S. government to find 
cost savings in these lean years.  The Department of Defense, because of the two wars 
(three including Pakistan) that it is fighting, has increased its level of spending over the 
last ten years.  However, it is evident from Congressional lawmakers’ rhetoric after the 
2010 Mid-Term elections and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ recent speeches and 
recommendations that the Department of Defense will have its budget pruned.   
One way the U.S. government can find efficiencies is through trimming or 
redirecting appropriations from programs that are proven ineffective.  The drug war in 
Colombia, though very successful in equipping the Colombians to fight the narco-
terrorists in areas that were previously unreachable, did not yield United States’ desired 
effect of reducing and eventually eliminating cocaine and other illicit drugs from 
reaching the United States’ shores.  The data presented show that the cocaine trade was 
unaffected because of the balloon effect with Colombia’s neighboring nations, the fact 
that farmers receive far more money and require less work and land to produce coca, and, 
most important, because the demand in the United States has not subsided.   
The narco-traffickers have developed more sophisticated and difficult to interdict 
methods to transport the illicit drugs to the United States.  The traffickers, in addition to 
their speed boats, now use semi-submersible vessels, each packed with ten tons of 
cocaine, that travel approximately 8 M.P.H., and have a range of 2,000 miles.  These 
vessels are very difficult to detect with radar systems.  The interdiction tactic of using a 
sniper rifle to pierce the engine of an outboard motor is ineffective with these semi-
submersible vessels (Adams, 2008, p. 1).  To combat the new methods, the U.S. 
government would need to spend even more money on interdiction and law enforcement 
because the traffickers became much more efficient.  
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A. UNITED STATES’ RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
The United States’ investment into the Colombian Drug War has not yielded the 
desired result.  Drugs continue to enter the United States and the demand for drugs has 
not decreased.  The illicit drug trade inherently inflates the price of the drugs, which 
raises the stakes for those individuals transporting the illegal products.  In turn, the drug 
market became very dangerous, costing many lives in the process.  Since the trade with 
Colombia of $11 billion annually is minimal in comparison with the United States’ Gross 
Domestic Product, halting trade will not adversely affect the United States.  However, the 
trade between the nations is useful in maintaining a partner in the region.  Any further 
investment in Colombia without a greater focus on rehabilitating the United States’ 
demand is a squandered investment.  Though Colombia is a strategic ally in the region, 
the recommended course of action is an increased the trade partnership, which supports 
their economy without the sense of a hand-out.  It also allows the United States to reduce 
the perception that it is nation building and reduces its overextension in foreign aid.   
B. DECISION POINTS 
The data compiled over the four decades that the United States has been engaged 
in a drug war shows that spending money on interdiction is ineffective.  The purpose for 
the United States going to Colombia was to stop the drugs at the source.  However, the 
drug epidemic ground zero is the user and his or her demand for the illicit drugs.  
Therefore, the United States is faced with four choices: 
1. Abandon combating the drug addiction problem completely  
2. Legalize all illicit drugs 
3. Change nothing and continue to focus on interdiction and law enforcement 
4. Focus on rehabilitation treatment and prevention 
While choices one and two are unlikely and will require lots of debate to become enacted, 
and three has been shown ineffective, choice four has a strategy in place.  If the 
administration pushes lawmakers to align funding in accord with this strategy, the 
strategy would reduce the demand for drugs will decrease and drug producers will be 
forced to find other goods to produce.  The downside to forcing the drug abusers into 
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rehabilitation programs subsidized by the government is two-fold.  Though it does not 
show the government advocates the use of drugs, rehabilitation programs give people a 
more desirable and less painful alternative to incarceration.  Therefore, those in the 
population that were deterred from using drugs because of the stigma or undesirable 
ramifications of being placed in prison, will possibly not see the lesser punishment as 
enough of a deterrent to trying drugs.  Secondly, this short-term increase in drug users 
will cost the government more in funds to rehabilitate depending on the severity of new 
addictions.  Though this increase in users will cost more in the short term, over the long 
term, we believe that this solution will most effectively reduce the demand for drugs and 
the abuse of these drugs.   
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